North Korea (DPRK);
Required Nuclear Deterrance
To: DPRK ambassador to United
From an ordinary USA citizen:
My opinion: The current US
administration cannot be trusted. I do not trust them. You should not trust them. Most US
citizens are uninformed and easily follow the misinformation fed by the US government.
Anything that is agreed to by current US administration can easily be disregarded in
future administrations according to current administration operating guidelines.US
Congress or Justice has little influence on restraining the Executive despite
Constitutional written checks.
To the Point: I would not like to
live under the communist system in North Korea for many reasons. But the economic
situation is the result of isolation from the International community primarily by the
"West".China is one of the world's most booming economies ,so the
"system" injected with flexibility can be "successful" economically.
North and South Korea can resolve their differences over an extended period
peacefully.Ridding the World and the Korean Peninsula of nuclear weapons is best for all
peoples of all nations.
But the road there is very
dangerous. Currently the US is a vigilante nation of enormous power and little constraint.
International law is not seen as valuable and only as a hindrance. Sometimes it is useful
on US terms,but never a valid constraint on US activities. Therefore ....Protect
You need a minimum nuclear
deterrance . Agree to a freeze under IAEA or other surveillance. Insist on your full
rights to develop all civilian nuclear power technology including enrichment and
reprocessing--- again under suitable surveillance--- and on a schedule ,if at all, that
makes sense for DPRK ,and consistent with a developing confidence by other nations. Agree
on the dismantling of current nuclear deterrance only on a schedule consistent with the US
honoring its NPT commitments to nuclear disarming, or as the full development of a
civilian nuclear industry (Japan comes to mind) with the technological capability to
rapidly implement a nuclear deterrance should a rogue state (possibly the US in
future)threaten a non-nuclear weapons DPRK.
I am convinced that the curent US
administration would attempt to take out all DPRK nuclear capability (risking Seoul and
Tokyo) if they thought they could. This would be disastrous for us in the US as well as
Asia. So, for all our sakes , do not become vulnerable by destroying your nuclear
deterrance.And, do not develop any nuclear capability beyond the minimally required
deterrance.Besides, that is tremendously wasteful of national resources.
Bill Rowe, small business owner
to the previous e-mail (above) and today's 19 Sept announcement of the agreement in
principle of DPRK dismantling nuclear weapons:
The agreement in principle is "OK". However, the US will try (and already is in
US media) attempting to use it to push their same old irrational aim of getting DPRK to
shamefully trade its sovereign dignity, by insulting its intelligence and demanding it
dismantle its entire nuclear technology base before it will consider "letting"
it have civilian nuclear, or other, energy/economic transfer programs. The US reneged on
its prior commitments for 2 LWR reactors. (It really did not even get the structures
started in over 10 years!.) Nothing has changed. The US is not a reliable negotiation
partner. US negotiation strategy lacks integrity. They have no intent to honor its
obligations to DPRK. By linking any future considerations of allowing civilian nuclear
programs to "when confidence is restored", only assures the US will never agree.
That is the plan veiled in diplomatic propaganda.
I trust DPRK is intelligent enough to know these facts without this e-mail. However, it
might be helpful to realize that some Americans also know that their government is not to
I think its very appropriate for DPRK to turn the tables on the US and require the US to
first establish DPRK confidence in the US (to keep its promises) by providing LWR (s)
before DPRK nuclear weapons programs are dismantled. I believe a reasonable schedule would
be as follows:
(1) DPRK agrees to immediately halt all work on nuclear weapons programs so as not to
further advance its current capability.
(2) 6-parties agree in principle to begin providing DPRK with economic/energy assistance
with a "frozen" (not dismantled) DPRK nuclear capability that is verified under
IAEA/NPT, while both sides build confidence over time. (This is where the US will stick
since they have no intent to engage in an "honest" process, but maybe other
partners might eventually force it through. If this step cannot be agreed on, the process
is essentially not going to go anywhere and the talks are useless and should be abandoned
until this step can be implemented.)
(3) DPRK identifies elements of its Nuclear programs to be frozen and under international
(4) 6-parties agree on the elements of economic/energy transfer and schedule.
........frozen nuclear programs, inspections, energy/economic transfers begin and continue
over time (possibly years) ....
(5) DPRK and 6-party talks continue on providing DPRK LWR(s).
(6) LWR(s) is built and begins operation in first cycle.
(7) DPRK dismantles its frozen nuclear weapons assets as pre-condition for further nuclear
fuel supply to LWR(s).
..... further longer term negotiations on increasing DPRK indigenous civilian nuclear
technologies like nuclear power plant construction/design/engineering, enrichment,fuel
fabrication, reprocessing , possibly in close cooperation with South Korea.